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Merger Policy Tools*
by Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty, and Pedro Pita Barros 
Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but 
also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have 
fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have 
been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of 
different antitrust actions – Prohibitions, Remedies, and Monitorings – to deter 
firms from engaging in mergers. We employ cross-jurisdiction/pan-time data on 
merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future 
merger frequencies. We find merger prohibitions to lead to decreased merger 
notifications in subsequent periods, and remedies to weakly increase future 
merger notifications: in other words, prohibitions involve a deterrence effect but 
remedies do not. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Auflagen heute, Untersagung morgen: Abschreckungswirkung von 
Wettbewerbs-intrumenten 
by Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty, and Pedro Pita Barros 
 
Wettbewerbspolitik ist nicht nur Regulierung von wettbewerbsfeindlichem Verhalten, 
sondern hat auch eine wesentliche Abschreckungswirkung. Weder Wissenschaftler noch 
politische Entscheidungsträger haben die Abschreckungswirkung von 
Wettbewerbspolitik vollständig untersucht, da es sehr schwierig ist diese Wirkung 
empirisch nachzuweisen. Wir untersuchen die Wirkung verschiedener 
wettbewerbspolitischer Maßnahmen – Untersagung, Auflagen und Monitoring – um 
Unternehmen von Zusammenschlüssen abzuhalten. Wir nutzen einen Panel-Datensatz, 
um den Einfluss von Wettbewerbspolitik auf die künftige Anzahl von 
Firmenzusammenschlüssen zu bewerten. Wir zeigen, dass die Untersagung von 
Zusammenschlüssen die Fusionsankündigung in der Zukunft reduziert, und dass 
Fusionsauflagen künftige Ankündigungen schwach ansteigen lassen. Anders gesagt: 
Untersagungen haben eine führen zu Abschreckungswirkung, Auflagen nicht. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust policy involves more than just the policing of actual antitrust cases and 
violations; it also involves deterrence effects. Paul Joskow states "U.S. antitrust policy is 
primarily a 'deterrence' system not a regulatory system" (2002: 98). Antitrust policy simply 
cannot scrutinize and vet all market behaviors, but instead relies on the development of 
antitrust rules which businesses are expected to internalize into their decisions. That 
deterrence effect is best enabled by an antitrust law system with clear signals and 
repercussions. For instance, Owen (2003) points out how the lack of resources and the 
inability to create credible commitments has led to the absence of any deterrence effect for 
Latin American antitrust policies; while Stigler (1966) attributes the decline in the relative 
frequency of horizontal mergers in the 1950’s to the deterrence effects of more vigorous 
enforcement of US antitrust laws. Accordingly, antitrust actions – when entwined with 
effective deterrence – may involve robust policy implications.1 In essence, the number of 
actual cases involving antitrust actions is potentially just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ when it comes 
to merger policy effects, as additional anti-competitive mergers are considered by businesses 
but never proposed (Davies & Majumdar, 2002).  
While an important issue, research on the deterrence effects of antitrust policy is 
generally an underdeveloped area. The ‘dearth of literature’ charge holds less well for 
collusion and anti-cartel policies where a number of studies exist (Block, Nold & Sidak, 1981; 
Kobayashi, 2002; Spagnolo, 2007). Merger policy, however, is an area where deterrence has 
been particularly under-researched. For instance, the influential U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (1999) divestiture study does not factor deterrence implications. Instead, the 
authors simply acknowledge that the total effect of the Commission's merger enforcement is 
presumably much greater than reflected by the actual number of remedies and prohibitions; 
                                                 
1 By antitrust actions, we collectively refer to the use of various merger policy tools by antitrust authorities: 
monitored mergers, remedied mergers, and merger prohibitions – all constitute antitrust actions (see ‘The Data’ 
section for more explanation). 
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 hence, they observe that deterred merger undertakings must certainly exist. This lack of 
accounting for merger-policy deterrence effects is also exhibited by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) which stated in its Fiscal Year 2001 Congressional submission: "we have not 
attempted to value the deterrent effects … of our successful enforcement efforts. While we 
believe that these effects … are very large, we are unable to approach measuring them” 
[Davies & Majumdar, 2002: p. 72]. A number of scholars (Eckbo, 1989; Davies & Majumdar, 
2002; Joskow, 2002; Crandall & Winston, 2003; Baker, 2003) agree that the lack of 
accounting for deterrence-effects suggests that the total-effect of merger policy is far more 
consequential than we currently acknowledge. 
Antitrust authorities in recent years have shown a proclivity to employ remedies to 
ameliorate the anti-competitive elements of proposed mergers instead of engaging in out-and-
out prohibitions. For instance, the European Commission (EC) has largely relied on structural 
and behavioral remedies by only blocking one merger since 2001. In the US, remedies 
constituted only twenty-three percent of US merger policy actions in the late 1980s; but by the 
year 2000, remedies were employed in over sixty percent of US merger cases requiring 
antitrust action (Parker & Balto, 2000). The increased adoption of remedies spurred the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) into studying the success of divestitures as a remedy for 
anti-competitive concerns: that already-mentioned study (U.S. FTC, 1999) found divestitures 
to generally create viable competitors.2 Accordingly, the FTC issued guidelines for remedies 
in 1999, the EC followed suit by issuing guidelines in 2001, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) in 2004 (Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2007). The codification of remedies as an 
important merger policy tool in these three highly visible authorities would seemingly 
influence less-experienced authorities which look to established authorities for guidance and 
benchmarking in the development of antitrust practices. An example of an overt influence by 
established authorities on less-experienced authorities rests with the European Union's (EU) 
                                                 
2 See Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2006, 2007) for a more sobering assessment of the success of EU remedies. 
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 accession criteria mandating that candidate-nation antitrust policies conform to EU policies 
(Dutz & Vagliasindi, 2000). Figure 1 corroborates the above conjecture on the diffusion of 
remedies as a favored practice by illustrating that the average ratio of remedies to prohibitions 
has substantially increased over the 1995-2005 period; thus, remedies have become by-far the 
most popular merger-policy tool in the cross-national environment for antitrust.  
Our main concern is that the above three points – i., the fact that merger policy 
involves important deterrence implications; ii., the deterrence effects of merger policy have, 
however, largely gone unmeasured; iii., the trend towards increased use of remedies as 
opposed to prohibitions as a merger policy tool – raise a potentially important issue that may 
have been neglected by antitrust authorities. In particular, the increased adoption of remedies 
as a tool to ameliorate the anti-competitive concerns with proposed mergers may come at the 
opportunity cost of neglecting the proper deterrence role of merger policy. Remedies may 
deal with the immediate anti-competitive concerns due to a proposed transaction, but may not 
send the necessary clear-signal of ‘probable detection and serious consequences’ for effective 
deterrence. In short, for deterrence purposes merger remedies may be an ineffective policy 
instrument; hence, the trend toward increased deployment of remedies as a merger policy tool 
may come at the expense of decreased deterrence. 
Accordingly, we propose to study here the impact of different merger policy tools 
(prohibitions, remedies and monitorings) on the proclivity of firms to engage in future merger 
transactions. After all, antitrust policy is directly aimed at firms' conduct; hence, considering 
the effect of changes in merger policy on firms’ future merger behavior merits attention. The 
immediate benefits of such a study are twofold. First, we begin the process of factoring the 
deterrence-effects of merger policy; thus, we start to quantify what has until now been 
unquantified. Second, by considering the deterrence-effects of different merger policy tools 
we are able to elicit which particular tools involve adequate deterrence. As Crandall and 
Winston argue, a need exists to “explain why some enforcement actions and remedies are 
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 helpful and others are not” (2003: 4). We begin that exercise of detecting the effectiveness of 
different merger policy instruments by considering whether prohibitions, remedies, and 
monitorings act as effective deterrents with regard to future merger frequencies. 
In order to support our analysis, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section II 
reviews the relevant existing literature in order to properly frame our contribution. Section III 
formally generates empirical expectations by setting out a model where prohibitions and 
remedies represent costs to proposed merger transactions; thus, spikes in antitrust actions 
potentially result in frequency-based deterrence. Section IV describes the unique cross-
section/time-series data set (28 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2005 period) employed 
for the empirical estimations. Section V describes the issues and techniques with regard to our 
dynamic panel data estimation. Section VI presents the empirical results. Section VII 
discusses and concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON RELATED LITERATURE 
A number of studies mention the importance of deterrence with respect to merger 
policy (Joskow, 2002; Crandall & Winston, 2003; Baker, 2003); however, very few studies – 
with the exception of Davies and Majumdar’s (2002) commissioned report for the UK Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT) – go further to analyze in depth the deterrence effects involved with 
merger policy. Instead, the great majority of the substantive scholarship on antitrust 
deterrence focuses on anti-cartel and collusion policies: in other words, what are the proper 
penalties to discourage collusion. Nevertheless, two general strands of empirical literature 
exist that broadly consider the merger-policy/deterrence-effect relationship: first, a few 
studies consider the composition of mergers to elicit how merger policy law changes might 
alter the nature of proposed mergers; second, a series of studies employ price-cost margins to 
measure the net-impact of antitrust and merger policies. The following paragraphs quickly 
review the above three literature strands (cartel deterrence, composition-based deterrence, and 
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 price-cost markup studies) in order to further motivate our analysis and nest our contribution 
in the relevant literature. 
First, the most extensive literature on antitrust deterrence resides in the realm of anti-
cartel and collusion policies. Building on Becker’s (1968) and Ehrlich’s (1973) early work on 
the economics of illicit behavior, a great deal of scholarship has considered how collusive-
pricing and market-sharing behavior might be understood, detected, and discouraged (see 
Baker, 2001; Van Eden, 2002; Spagnolo, 2007 for reviews). The following works in this 
tradition appear most germane to our topic, as they empirically support the existence of a 
deterrence effect when it comes to anti-cartel and collusion policy. Feinberg (1980) finds 
firms incurring Sherman act enforcements to subsequently have lower markups. Block, Nold 
and Sidak (1981) observe cartel prosecutions in one market to decrease markups in both that 
market and in similar regional markets. Block and Feinstein (1986) find antitrust enforcement 
in one market to robustly spillover into other sub-markets. Furthermore, Clarke and Evenett 
(2003) show that international cartel members tend to reduce their overcharges in national 
jurisdictions with strong cartel enforcement regimes. Accordingly, the empirical literature 
appears to have substantiated the existence of deterrence effects for anti-cartel policy. 
Second, a small literature exists on the deterrence effects of merger policy with respect 
to the composition of proposed mergers. As Aaronson (1992) notes, merger policy deterrence 
effects conceivably manifest in merger plans being forsaken (namely, a frequency-based 
deterrence effect), but also in mergers being shaped differently (namely, a composition-based 
deterrence effect). George Stigler (1966) first considered composition-based deterrence 
effects when he considered the impact of the 1950 anti-merger amendment to the Clayton Act. 
He found that statute – and the enforcement of that statute – to substantially discourage the 
proposal of horizontal mergers and encourage the proposal of vertical and conglomerate 
mergers; hence, the composition of mergers tilted toward more vertical and conglomerate 
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 types of pairings.3 Following in this vein, B. Espen Eckbo employed stock-price data to 
measure the composition of mergers and gain insights in to both merger welfare implications 
and potential deterrence effects. 4  Eckbo and Wier (1985) present evidence that non-merging 
firms (rivals to the merger) generally earned higher stock market premiums prior to the onset 
of the U.S. Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) reform than they did post-HSR; thus, suggesting that the 
HSR act deterred a number of anti-competitive mergers.5 Note, however, that Eckbo and Wier 
go on to question the optimality of the HSR act as they find antitrust actions to generally be 
anti-competitive: in that, rival firms surprisingly experience positive abnormal returns when 
authorities take action against merger proposals. Eckbo (1989) attempts to clarify the above 
contribution when he agrees that mergers are certainly deterred by more aggressive antitrust 
policy; though, he is concerned that efficient mergers are generally being deterred. In later 
work, Eckbo (1992) makes use of the absence of Canadian antitrust enforcement prior to 1985 
to indirectly test whether US policy deters anti-competitive mergers. He conjectures that there 
should be more anti-competitive horizontal mergers in Canada due to effective US deterrence; 
yet over the 1961-1982 period, he finds no evidence of the composition of proposed Canadian 
mergers being more anti-competitive than the composition of proposed US mergers. Although 
Eckbo (1992) considers how merger policy influences the type of proposed mergers (at least 
with respect to stock market evaluation), he does not directly identify whether a change in 
policy impacts (namely, deters) future merger behavior. 
                                                 
3 In response to tougher antitrust policy, firms can also try to change antitrust authority behavior. Pittman (1977), 
for example, finds that US firms increase their political campaign contributions in the years subsequent to 
receiving heavy antitrust scrutiny. 
4 B. Espen Eckbo (1983) and Robert Stillman (1983) first employed the event-study method on stock-price data 
to measure the welfare implications of mergers. The event study methodology measures the impact of an event 
on financial markets. In the merger policy context, the method concentrates on how a merger changes the market 
value of outsiders (rivals). A positive (negative) abnormal return to outsiders suggests a market-power enhancing 
(efficiency-gains increasing) merger, as the merger improves (reduces) the competitive position of rivals. The 
methodology has also received recent attention by scholars analyzing merger policy: for example, Duso, Neven 
& Röller, 2007; Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2006, 2007; Fridolfsson & Stennek, 2005. 
5 See Werden and Williams (1989) for a pointed critique of Eckbo & Wier (1985) and a good critique of the 
event-study methods’ appropriateness for evaluating merger policy (Fridolfsson & Stennek, 2005 also perform 
the latter). 
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 Third, a number of studies look at how antitrust policy indirectly influences firm 
behavior by studying its impact on industries ‘market power and price-cost margins’. This 
literature, however, tends to be somewhat inconclusive as some studies generate evidence 
critical of antitrust policy while others generate supportive evidence. The critical studies 
include: Crandall and Winston’s (2003) finding unsuccessful merger challenges to decrease 
and consent-decrees (divestitures) to increase price-cost margins in US manufacturing 
industries; Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzinsky (2001) detecting no significant changes in 
Belgian firms’ mark-ups after the strengthening of Belgian antitrust laws in 1993, but lower 
price mark-ups in the Netherlands where there was then no effective antitrust policy. The 
supportive studies include: Block, Nold and Sidak’s (1981) finding larger antitrust budgets to 
decrease markups for bread in the US; Warzinsky (2001) detecting tougher US merger policy 
from 1945-1973 leading to lower firm mark-ups as compared to the more lax period of 1973-
1991; Hoekman and Kee’s (2003) forty-two country study where the presence of antitrust 
legislation generates lower mark-ups via improved entry conditions. The above studies 
conceivably capture both the direct regulatory effects and the indirect deterrence effects 
involved with the establishment, resourcing and use of antitrust policies, but, do not 
disentangle the regulatory from the deterrence effects.  
 The literature summarized above covers a great deal of ground and generates a 
number of important insights, but suffers from some limitations. First, most of the above 
studies in the merger policy realm use only one observation of policy change: the before 
versus after a policy change comparison (Stigler, 1966; Eckbo & Wier, 1985; Konings, Van 
Cayseele and Warzinsky 2001; Warzinsky, 2001; Hoekman and Kee, 2003), or the countries-
having versus countries-not-having antitrust laws comparison (Eckbo, 1992; Konings, Van 
Cayseele and Warzinsky, 2001). Second, the price-cost markup literature finds it difficult – as 
already noted – to disentangle regulatory from deterrence effects: in essence, markups capture 
the ‘total effect’ of antitrust policies. Furthermore, by only looking at resulting market 
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 outcomes, the markup studies fail to consider merger behavior directly and fail to capture 
direct responses by firms to changing antitrust policies. Third, the existence of empirical 
studies considering the composition-based deterrence effects is important; however, there 
does not appear to be a companion literature that analyzes frequency-based deterrence 
effects—an equally important manifestation of deterrence. Fourth, it is fair to say that the 
empirical literature on the deterrence effects of cartel policy is far more advanced (and 
consistently supportive) than the literature concerning the deterrence effects of merger policy. 
We propose then to directly analyze the deterrence effects of different merger policy 
tools on future merger behavior, and by doing so, we hope to improve upon the existing 
literature in some respects. First, by considering the annual use of merger policy tools by 
different antitrust jurisdictions, we have numerous antitrust actions that provide multiple 
observations of antitrust conduct and help us move beyond the previous before/after and 
having/not-having comparisons. Second, by considering future changes in the number of 
notified mergers, we are both able to capture the proclivity to seek mergers (actual merger 
behavior) and to separate out the deterrence effects of merger policy from the regulatory 
effects. Third, by fixing the number of notified mergers as the dependent variable of interest, 
we are also able to provide some evidence with respect to the frequency-based deterrence 
effects of merger policy (namely, how many mergers are forsaken) as opposed to the 
literature's (admittedly a small literature) focus on the composition of proposed mergers. 
Fourth, we provide a much needed approach to advance the literature on measuring the 
deterrence effects of merger policy. As already noted, antitrust authorities and scholars have 
been at an impasse as to how to proceed and measure merger-policy deterrence effects. 
We should be clear here and note that investigating a change in the number of notified 
mergers does not necessarily equate to a change in the number of anti-competitive mergers—
the main interest of antitrust authorities. Eckbo (1989, 1992) has made this point in expressing 
concern, backed by some evidence, as to socially-efficient mergers being the types that are 
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 primarily deterred. It seems, however, more probable that a change in antitrust actions would 
have a greater impact on potential anti-competitive mergers than on potential competitive 
mergers. However in our data, we are unable to detect whether deterred mergers are efficient 
or anti-competitive; instead, we can only elicit frequency-based and not composition-based 
deterrence. Nevertheless, frequency-based deterrence is important once one realizes that 
antitrust authorities generally lack the resources and manpower to sufficiently vet all of the 
problematic merger proposals. Furthermore, the following theoretical section will show that in 
our model frequency-based deterrence involves less ambiguous empirical predictions than 
does composition-based deterrence. 
 
III. DETERRENCE EFFECTS 
 In order to ground the empirical analysis, it behooves us to analyze in a somewhat 
formal manner how merger policy tools may involve deterrence effects. An attempt to think 
rigorously about the effects of different merger policy instruments helps us move beyond 
casual justifications for empirical expectations. We concentrate here on the frequency-based 
deterrence effects of both prohibitions and remedies; furthermore, we consider the 
implications of a shift in the use of one policy tool (for example, prohibitions) towards 
another policy tool (for example, remedies), and how that may affect future merger 
frequencies. The premise behind our theoretical foundations is that spikes in remedies and 
prohibitions signal to firms the future intentions and tendencies of antitrust authorities.  
 We know that effective deterrence for antitrust policy requires those potentially 
tempted by anti-competitive actions to have a degree of certainty regarding the rules, and to 
believe that transgressing those rules involves a reasonable probability of being caught and 
suffering serious consequences (Craswell & Calfee, 1986; Baker, 2001). Becker (1968) notes 
that if the aim is simple deterrence then raising the probability of conviction close to one and 
having punishments exceed the gains of the crime would virtually eliminate offences. That 
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 insight simply suggests that effective deterrence requires the probability of detection and fines 
to be sufficiently high. 
To begin conceptualizing how deterrence effects can be operationalized in a merger 
context, we first consider the makeup of merger-related profits. While some mergers certainly 
create general efficiencies, Werden and Williams (1989) remark that mergers can have 
different effects in different markets.6 In other words, overall efficiency-effects might be 
produced in some markets while anti-competitive effects dominate in other markets. Davies 
and Majumdar (2002) point out that multi-product mergers between firms enhance this varied 
effects phenomenon. Accordingly, we can split merging firms’ profit gains into pro-
competitive profits (ΠPC) that do not harm social welfare, and anti-competitive profits (ΠAC) 
that come at the expense of social welfare—ΠAC represents the extra profits for merging firms 
when they cross the boundaries of merger policy regulations. Total merger profits equal then 
the sum of profits from markets where firms’ efficiency gains dominate and from markets 
where the anti-competitive elements dominate—total merger profits are thus ΠAC + ΠPC.  
Let us now think about the differences between the two antitrust actions of 
prohibitions and remedies.7 In the case of a prohibition, the penalty for proposing a merger 
with significant anti-competitive problems involves the full prohibition of the merger: both 
the pro-competitive and the anti-competitive profits for merging firms are negated by the 
prohibition. The throwing out of the pro-competitive profits along with the anti-competitive 
profits is important, as this brings about the punitive measure that Posner (1970) 
acknowledges as being crucial for deterrence. The big difference between remedies and 
prohibitions is that remedies attempt to identify and eliminate the anti-competitive elements 
of a merger. In essence, the merging firms are able to hold on to the pro-competitive elements 
of the merger—so they keep (ΠPC), but the anti-competitive elements of the merger (ΠAC) are 
                                                 
6 See Röller, Stennek and Verboven  (2000) for a survey of horizontal mergers and efficiency gains. 
7 These are the main decisions antitrust authorities take nowadays. 
 10
 negated by the remedial action. If an antitrust authority imposes remedies, then the 
disincentive for firms to propose anti-competitive mergers is clearly lower. In short, 
prohibitions seemingly involve more deterrence than do remedies, as prohibitions represent 
larger punishments. 
With the above as a backdrop, we now give a more formal structure and introduce 
some additional features to make our analysis realistic and suited for our empirical testing. 
The features of our model include the following: firms decide on the type – namely, 
restrictiveness – of mergers proposed; antitrust authorities either clear, remedy or prohibit a 
merger proposal; an antitrust authority has the option to alter the tendencies of its merger 
policy regime (for example, using more remedies at the expense of prohibitions); and 
uncertainty exists regarding an antitrust authority’s stance.8
First, the nature of the proposed merger will clearly affect merger profitability; in 
particular, the restrictiveness level (η ) of a merger proposal will influence both the pro-
competitive and anti-competitive elements of merger profitability. For instance, firms may 
take merger measures that simultaneously increase both efficiency (yielding pro-competitive 
profits) and market power (yielding anti-competitive profits): the closing of branches in the 
case of bank mergers might generate efficiencies but also soften price competition. 
Accordingly, we define restrictiveness broadly: decisions over merger targets, product lines, 
geographic markets, contracts with suppliers, and so on—are all subsumed in this variable η. 
Naturally, the level of anti-competitive profits depends positively on the degree of 
restrictiveness for the proposed merger, 0)( ≥∂
Π∂
η
ηAC . For instance, a firm may decide to 
acquire a direct competitor in lieu of a less-related target, thus increasing restrictiveness and 
thereby anti-competitive profits.  
                                                 
8 Sah (1991) models a process similar to our setup, but in the context of explaining patterns of crime. As we do, 
he is interested in investigating how individuals’ choices are determined endogenously, while incorporating the 
information available to them. The resulting dynamic relationships are then studied to examine how behaviour 
might evolve over time. 
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 The restrictiveness-level decision should in general positively impact a merger’s pro-
competitive profits ( ), as any efficiency effects from greater restrictiveness will 
translate into increased pro-competitive profits. For instance, more market power may lead to 
a higher innovation incentive, thus leading to more efficiency—efficiency effects which may 
dominate market-power effects in some markets but not in other markets. While the impact of 
restrictiveness on pro-competitive profits may in principle be negative at times, the impact of 
restrictiveness on anti-competitive profits dwarfs the impact on pro-competitive profits. 
Hence, the net effect of restrictiveness on total profits (Π
)(ηPCΠ
AC + ΠPC) is very likely to be 
positive, as firms choose η in such a way as to maximise total profits. Thus, it is intuitive to 
follow Barros (2003) and assume that total profits increase: 0)()( ≥∂
Π∂+∂
Π∂
η
η
η
η PCAC . In 
short, firms have a profit incentive to propose mergers with higher levels of restrictiveness. 
The antitrust authority then assesses the merger by confronting the restrictiveness 
level, η, proposed by the merging firms with its own judgement of the market—a judgement 
that defines an admissible level ˆ η. As already noted, antitrust authorities – when facing a 
merger – have three possible decisions: prohibit the merger, remedy the merger to allow for 
approval, and clear the merger without conditions. We model this decision process in a simple 
way: for η ≤ ˆ η , the merger is cleared without any conditions; for ˆ η < η ≤ ˆ η + α , the merger is 
subjected to remedies. Note that parameter α  – the range for the remedy solution – denotes 
the extra level of restrictiveness the authority is willing to accept as long as remedies are 
imposed. Finally, for η > ˆ η + α , the merger is not allowed under any conditions—the merger 
is prohibited.  
The judgement of the antitrust authority with respect to admissible levels of 
restrictiveness is ex-ante unclear to firms when they decide on whether to propose a merger 
and on which type of merger to propose. Unlike cartels – where it is relatively easy for firms 
to see where the lines are drawn – many merging firms will be uncertain as to whether a 
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 proposed merger would be too restrictive in the eyes of the antitrust authority. Merger policy 
regulations exhibit a degree of uncertainty as antitrust authorities can give guidelines but not 
very precise guidelines (Davies & Majumdar, 2002)—in essence, merger policy is simply too 
complex to generate 'per se' rules. Accordingly, a key ingredient for a firm’s choice of merger 
is the expected ˆ η . The expectation about the critical restrictiveness value, ˆ η , is represented by 
the probability distribution )ˆ(ηF .9
According to the above setup (where the merging parties receive the full profits under 
a clearance, the pro-competitive profits under a remedy, and no profits under a prohibition), 
firms expect a profit given by: 
KFFFV PCPCAC −Π−−+−Π+Π= )())()(())(1))(()(( ηαηηηηη . 
Note that K measures the cost of building up the merger proposal—a fixed cost. Accordingly, 
a merger is proposed if firms, after choosing optimally η (namely, maximize V with respect 
to η), have V > 0. Clearly, a lower K leads to more mergers. Yet more interesting is the 
impact of a change in α , as this reflects a merger policy change (a movement of the boundary 
between remedies and prohibitions). Increasing α  means that authorities are willing to use 
remedies in cases where previously they would outright reject a merger. Per our descriptive 
analysis, this policy substitution from prohibitions to remedies is empirically relevant. 
 By the envelope theorem, the impact on merger proposals can be seen from 
0)()( >Π−= ηαη∂α
∂ PCfV . 
Hence, the policy substitution from prohibitions to remedies should induce a higher number 
of future merger proposals. Curiously, the effect upon the restrictiveness of future merger 
proposals – namely, )/( ∂α∂η  – is ambiguous. Indeed, via an application of the envelope 
theorem, sign ; and taking the derivative yields )/()/( 2 ∂η∂α∂∂α∂η Vsign=
                                                 
9 To simplify the exposition we take α  to be known, but explain below how it would work with uncertainty 
over α .  
 13
 ∂η
η∂αηηαη∂
αη∂
∂η∂α
∂ )()()(
)(
)(2 PcPC ffV Π−+Π−
−= . 
Importantly, both the first and second terms can be negative: replacing prohibitions with 
remedies could lead to less – not more – restrictiveness in future merger proposals. The first 
term can be either positive or negative, depending on the distribution shape of f(.) in the range 
of αη − .10’11 The first terms indeterminate sign owes to the change in alpha involving two 
different effects. By increasing α, the antitrust authority applies remedies to some mergers 
that previously incurred prohibitions; thus, merging firms are more likely to obtain the pro-
competitive profits. When pro-competitive profits are positively correlated with 
restrictiveness, the marginal benefit from a higher η increases. The importance of this extra 
incentive to increasing η, however, depends on how often firms expect to be in this range: in 
general, the number of cases to which this applies is likely to be smaller for a higher η. When 
the marginal impact of restrictiveness on pro-competitive profits is small and increasing η 
increases the probability of incurring a prohibition then the firms involved in the merger may 
prefer to reduce restrictiveness in order to increase the probability that the merger incurs a 
remedy as opposed to a prohibition. Furthermore, the second term can also be negative when 
a more restrictive merger yields lower pro-competitive profits. In short, our model generates 
ambiguous predictions with regard to the composition of future merger proposals; in other 
words, the equilibrium effect on composition-based deterrence is not clear. The predictions on 
the frequency of future merger proposals – namely, frequency-based deterrence – suggest a 
more unambiguous effect; accordingly, the number of mergers represents our natural variable 
of interest when it comes to measuring deterrence effects. 
 The same model can be used to address two additional policy shifts of importance: 
increasing remedies at the expense of fewer clearances; and increasing prohibitions at the 
                                                 
10 If we take, for example, F to be a negative exponential density, the effect would be negative. On the other 
hand, if F is a density with an increasing hazard rate (for example, the normal or weibull distributions), then the 
effect would be positive.  
11  
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 expense of fewer clearances. The simplest way to look at these “policy shifts” is to see them 
as transfers of mass probability from one region of the probability distribution F to another—
a simplification that allows us to clearly convey the basic intuition. Take the following 
definition of expected profit from a notified merger: 
KFFFV PCACPC −+−−Π+−−−Π+Π= ))()(())(1)(( 121 βαηηββη  
where β1 is a mass probability increase for remedies imposition coming at the expense of a 
lowering in clearances, while β2 is the increase in mass probability for prohibitions coming at 
the expense of clearances. Using again the envelope theorem, we see that the number of 
notified mergers drops as βi  increases; but moreover, the restrictiveness of the proposed 
mergers does not necessarily decrease.12 From this simple model, we can extract some 
implications regarding policy shifts that can be summarized in the following table: 
Policy Change Notifications Restrictiveness 
Increase in 
prohibitions with a 
decrease in clearances 
Decrease Uncertain 
Increase in 
prohibitions with a 
decrease in remedies 
Decrease Uncertain 
Increase in remedies 
with a decrease in 
clearances 
Decrease Uncertain 
 
Before turning to empirical expectations, it is important to conceptually make the link 
between changes in merger policy, changes in antitrust actions, and changes in firm beliefs 
with regard to antitrust stances. We propose here how one might reason the above process 
while taking into account uncertainty regarding merger policy rules. First off – due to the lack 
of clarity for merger policy rules – firms must make inferences as to the actual stances of 
antitrust authorities: namely, what are the critical parameters for eliciting remedies and 
prohibitions. Firms make inferences then about ηˆ and α  based both on the antitrust 
                                                 
12 Verifying these claims amounts to simple comparative statics exercises on η . 
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 authorities’ past antitrust actions and on the imperfect knowledge firms have of the η for the 
previously proposed mergers of other firms.13 The imperfect knowledge comes from 
information publicly released – from the press and antitrust authorities – about the merger and 
from information firms have about the industry.14 Changes in antitrust actions (prohibitions 
and remedies) represent then manifestations of actual merger policy changes; hence, firms 
update their beliefs on the antitrust authority’s stance when they witness changes in antitrust 
actions. If this updating is done in a Bayesian manner, then increases in a particular antitrust 
action lead to the positive updating of the probability of eliciting such an action. Indeed, Sah 
(1991) showed that if perceptions are described by Bayesian inference, then the above 
properties are satisfied. Accordingly, a spike in the application of a particular antitrust action 
can lead to firms updating their perception about an antitrust authority's real position; in other 
words, a change in antitrust actions potentially signals the future tenor of merger policy.15 
With the above in mind, we can generate some simple expectations for empirical testing. 
First, we predict that a spike in prohibitions leads to positive updating of the perceived 
probability of a prohibition. Prohibition spikes may reflect that the boundary between 
remedies and prohibitions has been altered (a decrease in the perceived α), but may also 
reflect a mass transfer in probability from clearances to prohibitions. Since prohibitions have 
a significant deterrence effect (namely, they represent a higher cost to merging as compared to 
remedies and clearances), individual firms will be less inclined to propose a merger and future 
merger notifications should go down. The above can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
13 This would work similarly for 1β  and 2β . Recall that the certainty assumption in the formal model with 
regard to merger policy rule ‘ α ’ (and for 1β  and 2β ) was done for tractability reasons. 
14 If other firms, for example, propose a merger that would create a monopoly or facilitate exclusive territories; 
then, the proposed η  is high. If the proposed merger would not substantially increase concentration; then, the 
proposed η  is low. Authorities decide then on a particular antitrust action for each proposed merger with its 
attendant restrictiveness level. Accordingly, firms 'see'  and ηˆ α  through previous merger proposals and the 
antitrust actions taken in these cases. 
15 Take for instance an increase in prohibitions: if a merger with high η  is rejected, then there may be little 
updating on α . If, on the other hand, firms see a prohibition of a merger with a relatively low η , then α  is 
revised substantially downwards.  
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 Hypothesis 1: An increase in prohibitions leads to frequency-based deterrence: a 
decrease in future merger notifications.  
 
Second, we predict that a spike in remedies leads to positive updating of the perceived 
probability of a remedy. Remedy spikes may reflect that the boundary between remedies and 
prohibitions has been altered (an increase in the perceived α), but may also reflect a mass 
transfer in probability from clearances to remedies. Accordingly, an increase in remedies may 
have two possible effects on future merger frequencies: 1) a negative effect when remedies 
come at the expense of clearances; 2) a positive effect when remedies come at the expense of 
prohibitions. Thus when firms positively update their perceptions about an authority using 
remedies, the net-effect depends on whether the spike in remedies lowers the perceived 
probability of prohibitions more than the perceived probability of clearances. If the former 
effect dominates, then an increase in remedies leads to the perception of a less-tough future 
merger policy and we should witness a higher proclivity for firms to seek mergers. On the 
other hand, if the probabilities of future clearances go down then an increase in remedies 
should result in a lower proclivity for firms to seek mergers. The above can be summarized as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in remedies leads to indeterminate frequency-based 
deterrence: future merger notifications decrease when remedies substitute for 
clearances, but future merger notifications increase when remedies substitute for 
prohibitions.  
 
To keep things simple, we have until this point excluded the merger policy option of 
monitorings. In part, this was driven by the prior that the effects of monitorings are relatively 
suspect, as firms subjected to monitorings may not actually be incurring a real punishment. 
Monitorings may then send a noisy signal of an antitrust authority’s true intentions; hence, 
merging parties perceptions may not change. In fact, nowhere have we seen any claims by 
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 antitrust authorities or experts that monitorings involve deterrence. Nevertheless, we will 
consider the impact of monitorings – since they are an antitrust action – on future merger 
frequencies in the empirical setup. 
 
IV. THE DATA 
The actual data consist of annual measures of merger policy for 28 antitrust 
jurisdictions over the 1992-2005 period; hence, the unit of observation for the empirical tests 
is antitrust jurisdiction by year. The OECD directs members and associates to respond to 
specific questions in order to generate annual reports on the state of antitrust policy in those 
jurisdictions. Thus, the OECD's annual reports on 'Competition Policy in OECD Countries' 
provide raw data on cross-national antitrust policies that can be compiled into empirical 
measures. While the OECD reports are the main source of data for this study, additional data 
were gathered via direct contact with—and specific reports from—actual antitrust authorities 
in order to fill any data holes and reconcile any incompatibilities. The overriding concern in 
data compilation was to create consistently accurate measures of national antitrust policies. In 
doing so, the data are necessarily characterized as unbalanced panels—as a number of annual 
observations were missing or necessarily dropped in order to yield consistent cross-
jurisdiction/pan-time measures. 
The first construct of primary interest for our empirical analysis is merger behavior—
namely, the number of mergers occurring. As a measure for the number of mergers, our 
dependent variable, we use the annual number of transactions that are notified in the antitrust 
jurisdiction (hereafter referred to as Mergers).  This measure has two main advantages. First, 
it is a construct with very little measurement error, since antitrust authorities report accurately 
the number of notified mergers by year. Second, it is probable that those mergers that must be 
notified to merger authorities—of which the number of potentially anti-competitive mergers is 
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 a subset—are the ones that change their behavior the most in response to a change in antitrust 
actions.  
We also have measures that help capture the annual level of regulatory scrutiny given 
merger activity in a particular antitrust jurisdiction: our core explanatory variables. 'Antitrust 
Actions' refers to an antitrust jurisdictions annual sum of monitorings, remedies, and 
prohibitions. Where 'Monitorings' are the number of transactions cleared but with 
commitments by the antitrust authority to monitor post-merger behavior, 'Remedies' are the 
number of transactions cleared but forced to undertake behavioral or structural remedies to 
ameliorate anti-competitive concerns, and  'Prohibitions' are the number of transactions that 
are out-right prevented by the antitrust authority.16 Accordingly, antitrust actions represent an 
annual count of the possible merger policy actions taken by a particular jurisdiction with 
respect to merger behavior: with monitorings, remedies and prohibitions representing the 
three sub-categories of actions. Table 1 reports summary statistics – based on the observations 
employed in the empirical estimations – for the Mergers variable and the three types of 
Antitrust Actions broken down by the twenty-eight antitrust jurisdictions. 
  Antitrust authorities have steadily increased their actions during the 1990’s both in 
absolute and relative terms. With regard to an absolute increase in antitrust actions: the 
average number of yearly antitrust actions has evolved from a little under six actions per 
jurisdiction at the beginning of our sample to a peak of roughly 10.4 actions per jurisdiction in 
2000. Figure 2 illustrates the trend in yearly antitrust actions along with the average number 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that we have data on Abandonments (number of transactions abandoned by merging parties 
due to anti-competitive concerns by the antitrust authority) for twenty five jurisdictions (except Australia, Greece 
and the US). However, this measure of Antitrust Action suffers from a great deal of measurement error, as 
antitrust authorities differ significantly in the degree to which (and how) they report this measure. Nevertheless, 
we should state that the empirical results reported later in the paper are very much robust to the inclusion of this 
additional Antitrust Action variable in unreported estimations (this fact is doubly important once we recognize 
that the auxiliary estimations exclude the US—a seemingly important antitrust jurisdiction). Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimates regarding the frequency-based deterrence effect of Abandonments are insignificant.  
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 of merger notifications per jurisdiction over the 1994-2004 period. Witness how the 
tendencies in antitrust actions coincide with the global merger wave.17  
 With regard to a relative increase in antitrust actions: figure 3 illustrates the average 
across all jurisdictions in our data set of the number of antitrust actions relative to the number 
of notified mergers. The figure shows that in the beginning of the nineties around 1.5% of all 
notified mergers triggered an action by authorities, and shows a steady rise in this rate to 5% 
by 2005. The tendencies in the absolute number of antitrust actions are surely a response to 
the merger wave of the nineties. If more mergers are notified, then more mergers may be 
subject to some sort of antitrust scrutiny—a pure statistical effect. The relative increase of 
actions, however, tells us more. It may convey that antitrust authorities have become tougher 
and increasingly “punish” proposed mergers. This observation certainly conforms to the 
received wisdom that antitrust in the cross-national context has experienced both greater 
adoption and strengthening over the last two decades. It may also indicate that authorities 
have raised notification threshold levels in an effective manner in order to not waste limited 
institutional resources on harmless mergers (De Loecker, Konings & Van Cayseele, 2007). 
This leads naturally to a higher percentage of antitrust actions, as the population of notified 
mergers will consist of more anti-competitive mergers. We will control for this possibility in 
the empirical specification.  
In sum, antitrust authorities responding to the need to vet mergers for anti-competitive 
effects during the unprecedented 1990’s merger wave have tended toward the following 
practices. First, we witness an increase in the number of antitrust actions: measured both in 
absolute terms (figure 2) and with respect to merger notifications (figure 3). The trend 
manifested in figure 3 toward higher levels of antitrust actions per merger notification is 
potentially driven by beefed-up antitrust policies and/or by changing merger thresholds for 
                                                 
17 The average number of antitrust actions was around 9.2 in 1998, falling to 8.9 in 1999 and rising again to 10.4 
in 2000. Further, the average number of merger notifications peaked at 598 in 1998, falling to 399 in 1999 and 
rising again to 437 in 2000. Thus -- although not peaking in the same year -- antitrust actions and merger 
notifications go together both up and down.  
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 reporting. Second, we witness an important trend with respect to the employment of merger 
policy tools: figure 1 illustrates that antitrust authorities principally—and increasingly—rely 
on remedies for anti-competitive mergers; and less commonly use the practice of prohibitions. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Our formal empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy tools relies on 
Mergers as the dependent variable and the various antitrust actions (Prohibitions, Remedies 
and Monitorings respectively) that an authority undertakes as the core explanatory variables. 
Yet, the number of antitrust actions undertaken is of course a function of the number of 
notified Mergers. Thus as a first step in attempting to control for the endogeneity of antitrust 
actions, we use the various lagged antitrust actions as explanatory variables.18 Any study on 
merger behavior should also take into account that mergers often occur in waves (Harford, 
2005). This is very much the case for our data: covering the 1992-2005 period and coinciding 
with the highest merger wave in history (Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2004). To take this 
wave behavior into account, we include as right-hand side variables lagged terms of Mergers; 
hence, current merger behavior is partly explained by past merger behavior. We also include 
year dummies to capture any additional period-specific shocks. 
Merger waves also typically coincide with economic booms and high stock markets 
(Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2004). Accordingly, we add two control variables for economic 
conditions to help capture merger waves. First, we add economic growth (percentage change 
in GDP from the previous year)—hereafter referred to as ‘Growth’.  Second, for stock market 
conditions, we add capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP—hereafter 
referred to as Stock-Market. Note that the addition of Growth and Stock-Market represents 
                                                 
18 One can argue that an antitrust authority that starts an investigation also gives a signal about its toughness. 
Unfortunately, the OECD reports do not provide extensive data on the number of investigations started; thus, 
antitrust investigations are not present in this analysis.  
 21
 two additional means (beyond the lagged Mergers and period-specific effects) to control for 
merger waves.  
We may also need to control for changes in notification thresholds since we use 
notified mergers as the dependent variable. Merger thresholds tend to be composed of three 
different elements (worldwide sales, domestic sales, and market shares); furthermore, 
different antitrust authorities tend to mix-and-match their use of these three elements with 
some authorities employing all three elements to elicit notifications and others employing 
only one or two elements. Moreover, these elements can sometimes be based on individual 
firm measures or on combined merger entity measures. Given the share complexity and 
variation in the different types of threshold regulations manifested in the cross-national 
environment for antitrust, we decided to use dummies for threshold changes. All jurisdictions 
in our sample experienced a maximum of three threshold changes in our sample period 1992-
2005. Twenty-three jurisdictions experienced at least one change, twelve experienced two 
changes, and one experienced three changes.19 Accordingly, we created three dummy 
variables: ‘Threshold1’, ‘Threshold2’ and ‘Threshold3’ were respectively set to one for the 
year (and subsequent years) when jurisdictions experience a first, second and third threshold 
change.  
The period 1992-2005 was also a very active law-making period – in large part due to 
the expected entrance of ten new EU members. As previously noted, some scholarship 
considers how changes in antitrust laws impact competition (Stigler, 1966; Hoekman & Kee, 
2003); hence, changes in antitrust statutes may also directly impact merger behavior. We 
constructed dummies for important changes in antitrust laws based on the OECD reports. It is 
arguably a rather subjective exercise to identify ‘important’ changes, so we specifically 
looked for the words ‘important’, ‘substantial’ and ‘major’ in the reports. We found twenty-
                                                 
19 Data were collected mainly from Global Competition Review yearbooks and complemented with the OECD 
reports. The remaining countries that experienced ‘no changes’ in thresholds (Australia, Italy, New Zealand and 
Norway) officially do not have merger notification threshold levels. 
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 three jurisdictions to have had at least one important legislative change and nine additional 
jurisdictions to experience a second important legislative change over the period of study. 
Accordingly, we again created two dummy variables: ‘Law1’ and ‘Law2’ were respectively 
set to one for the year (and subsequent years) when jurisdictions experienced a first and 
second substantive change to antitrust legislation. Note also that we will control for panel 
specific effects; thus, helping to control for institutional differences across antitrust 
jurisdictions. 
The European Union also began applying a whole new set of rules in 2004 that created 
inter alia a new antitrust enforcement system—an enforcement system based on close 
cooperation between the European Commission and the national antitrust authorities in the 
framework of the European Competition Network (ECN). The stated aim was for better 
coordination of enforcement efforts and the promotion of a common competition culture 
between the EU and its member states. Given its potential impact, we included an additional 
dummy ‘EU 2004 Reform’: set to one in 2004 and 2005 for all EU member jurisdictions.  
Summarizing the above, we estimate how Mergers depend on past Mergers, Antitrust 
Actions and Controls: 
,,,, titii,t1i,tkti
k
kti ControlsctionsAntitrustAMergersMergers ελωδγβα ++++++= −−∑     
where i indexes the twenty-eight antitrust jurisdictions, t indexes time (year), and k the 
number of included lags for Mergers. The vector of Antitrust Actions consists of Prohibitions, 
Remedies and Monitorings – all lagged. Controls represents the vector of control variables: 
dummies for the first and second important changes in law (Law1 and Law2), the 2004 reform 
in the EU (EU 2004 Reform), dummies for the first, second and third threshold changes 
(Threshold1, Threshold2 and Threshold3), and economic and stock market variables (Growth 
and Stock-Market). Finally, ωi represents the unobserved jurisdiction-specific effect, tλ  are 
the year dummies and ti,ε  the disturbances.  
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  We log-transform the Mergers and critical Antitrust Actions variables in order to 
yield some additional estimation advantages. First, log-transforming helps moderate – or 
cancel out – the significant size differences between the different antitrust jurisdictions by 
generating elasticities for coefficient estimates. Second, log-transforming also addresses to 
some extent the count nature of the data for Mergers and Antitrust Actions by making the data 
more continuous.20 Hence, all the variables are in logs for our estimations—except for the 
dummy variables and the two economic conditions variables.21
 It also behooves us to employ the methodology of dynamic panel data models (see 
Bond, 2003, for a solid overview), as we include autoregressive dynamics of the dependent 
variable (Mergers) on the right-hand side. The serial correlation in the Mergers series implies 
that a least-squares or within-groups estimation would result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates.22 For this reason, we estimate our expression instrumenting for lagged Mergers – as 
well as for the antitrust action and control variables – using the system generalized method of 
moments (System GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a GMM estimator that treats the model as a 
system of equations – one for each time period. The predetermined and endogenous variables 
in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels. A problem with the 
                                                 
20 To be precise, since many of our antitrust actions variables report zeros, we use the log-transformation after 
having added a 1 to all the Antitrust Actions and Mergers variables. Employing the absolute number of antitrust 
actions as variable constructs instead of relative changes in the action portfolios of different antitrust authorities 
(for example, prohibitions as a percentage of antitrust actions) yields some estimation benefits. First relative 
changes in the use of antitrust actions may not properly capture the impact of a spike in the use of a particular 
antitrust action. Consider for example antitrust authority ‘A’ that uses prohibitions in 10% of all antitrust actions, 
but takes only 10 antitrust actions per year; thus, effectively blocking one merger a year. Antitrust authority ‘A’ 
may actually deter less than an antitrust authority ‘B’: which uses prohibitions in only 5% of antitrust actions, 
but takes 100 antitrust actions per year; thus, effectively blocking five mergers per year. Second, relative changes 
in the antitrust action portfolio are also controlled for by our approach via measuring the impact of a change in a 
particular antitrust action while holding other actions constant. For example, the coefficient estimate for 
Prohibitions must be understood as indicating the effect of a spike in yearly prohibitions while holding the 
absolute number of Remedies and Monitorings constant—variable measures that are also likely to increase 
during merger wave peaks. Accordingly, our explanatory variable constructs for Antitrust Actions capture both 
absolute and relative changes in that particular concept. 
21 The economic conditions variables are non-count variables and already expressed in percentage terms: 
percentage change in economic growth, and stock market valuation as a percentage of overall GDP. 
22 The OLS level estimator is inconsistent and biased upwards, since the lagged term of Mergers is positively 
correlated with the error term. It can also be shown that the standard Within Group estimator is inconsistent and 
biased downwards when including autoregressive dynamics of the dependent variable. 
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 original Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for first 
differences. Adding an equation in levels to be estimated with the equation in first differences 
(namely, estimating a system of equations) improves the performance of the estimator. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) described how – if the original equations in levels were added to 
the system – additional moment conditions could be brought to bear to increase efficiency and 
to reduce finite sample bias. Two testable assumptions are required for the use of these 
estimators. First, in order to reach identification, the disturbances εi,t must be serially 
uncorrelated. This is equivalent to having no second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, and can thus be directly tested in the first-differenced model. Second, 
the instruments must be uncorrelated with the first-differenced residuals, which can be tested 
using the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.23  
Accordingly, it behooves us to instrument for all potentially endogenous and 
predetermined variables. In particular, we treat the lagged merger variables as endogenous (as 
the methodology of dynamic panel data prescribes), the stock market variable as endogenous, 
and the lagged antitrust actions and threshold variables as predetermined. First, event studies 
show that merger announcements – which are customarily followed by a merger notification – 
may have a direct impact on stock markets (see Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2006, 2007); thus, 
the stock-market variable may also be endogenous. Furthermore, lagged antitrust actions may 
sometimes be correlated with past merger notification shocks when an antitrust authority does 
not come to a definite decision in the same year as the merger notification. And finally, the 
OECD reports clearly state that merger thresholds have been changed in many countries in 
response to a rise in past merger notifications.  
A downside of the proposed methodology, however, is that, although the number of 
valid moment conditions increases with the number of periods and these improve efficiency, 
the system GMM estimator may use too many moment conditions with respect to the number 
                                                 
23 Additionally, the main assumption to use the augmented system estimator is that unobserved jurisdiction 
effects are uncorrelated with changes in the error term.  
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 of available observations.24 Put simply, too many instruments may lead to over-fitting the 
instrumented variables and bias the results. Therefore, it also behooves us to estimate – as a 
robustness check – our regression equation while only instrumenting for the clearly 
endogenous variables and while treating all other explanatory variables as exogenous. By 
doing so, we can keep the number of instruments relatively low and mitigate the over-fitting 
bias. Recall also that our employment of lagged antitrust actions as explanatory variables does 
mitigate the endogeneity problems with a contemporaneous relationship. Still, since our panel 
is relatively small, it could be that the efficiency gains from system GMM are also small. 
Therefore – keeping in mind that OLS, and Fixed and Random effects estimations potentially 
suffer from correlation between the (transformed) lagged dependent variables and the 
(transformed) error term, we also report these results.  
Our main empirical results consist of six regression specifications that attempt to 
take the above issues into account. First, regressions’ #1, #2 & #3 respectively report the 
OLS, Random and Fixed effects estimation results—where all three estimations include fixed 
period-specific effects. Regression #4 reports the results of a GMM estimation where only the 
clearly-endogenous lagged dependent variables are instrumented for. Regression #5 reports 
the results of a GMM estimation where the potentially-endogenous variables (lagged 
dependent variables and the Stock-Market variable) are instrumented for. Regression #6 
reports the results of a GMM estimation where the potentially-endogenous variables (lagged 
dependent variables and the Stock-Market variable) and the potentially-predetermined 
variables (Prohibitions, Remedies, and the Threshold variables) are instrumented for.  
 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Table 2 reports the estimation results for the six regression specifications. Before we 
discuss the constructs of primary interest, we comment on the adequateness of the model in 
                                                 
24 In cases where the number of instruments is large relative to the number of observations, system GMM results 
are biased toward those of OLS. 
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 all six regressions. All six estimations perform reasonably well in terms of model 
specification. First, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions yields evidence in all three 
GMM estimations (regressions’ #4, #5 & #6) indicating that one cannot reject the hypothesis 
of no correlation between instruments and error terms. Second, the null hypothesis of no 
second order autocorrelation on the error differences cannot be rejected, suggesting that serial 
autocorrelation does not exist in the error terms (the smallest of all three estimations reports 
Pr>z=0.555). Third, the R-squared terms in Regressions’ #1 & #3 are relatively high at 0.96 
& 0.92 respectively, though largely a function of the regression model’s dynamic nature. In 
short, the regression model seems to pass the necessary diagnostics and be well specified in 
terms of statistical significance. Before discussing the coefficients of primary interest, we 
comment here on the control variables: 
 The two lags of Mergers seem to be important variables. The first lag is positive and 
highly significant for all six estimations. While the second lag is insignificant – and negative 
– throughout, its inclusion appears appropriate as the negative sign allows for the eventual 
downturn in a merger wave. Further, we tested for and rejected the presence of a coefficient 
equal or higher than one concerning the sum of the two lagged Merger terms in all six 
specifications.25  
 First, second, and third changes in thresholds (‘Threshold1’, ‘Threshold2’ and 
‘Threshold3’) do not generally have a statistically robust effect on notified mergers in the 
regression equations. However, Threshold1 in regression #3 (the fixed-effects estimation) 
does indicate the expected ‘fewer merger notifications’ in the years subsequent to the first 
change in a jurisdiction’s threshold level. The overall insignificance might owe to the fact that 
dummies in a log-log specification measure a change in slope and not a change in intercepts 
(we would of course only expect threshold changes to impact intercept terms).  
                                                 
25 We performed simple t-tests. Bond et al. (2005) showed that in panel data with relatively short panels, t-tests 
have good size properties and high power—even when series are potentially close to unit root. These properties 
are particularly valid in simple OLS and system GMM specifications. 
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  Important changes in antitrust laws (‘Law1’ and ‘Law2’) do not generally indicate a 
statistically significant impact over our period of study. Though as with threshold changes, the 
first law change in regression #3 (the fixed-effects estimation) does involve statistical 
significance: where the first law change is followed by an increase in notified mergers in 
subsequent years. Since these are dummy variables in a log-log regression, the same comment 
applies as above with threshold changes.26 The EU 2004 Reform variable is significant and 
negative in four out of the six regression equations; thus, suggesting that the EU reforms 
generally led to fewer merger notifications in all the EU member antitrust jurisdictions. 
 The macroeconomic conditions (Growth) variable is significant and positive in 
regressions’ #1 & #2; thus, yielding some support that economic growth generates merger 
waves. This result is in line with neo-classical theories on mergers that assume managers to 
maximize profits and mergers to become more profitable during economic booms 
(Lambrecht, 2004). Stock market conditions have a negative and significant impact on 
Mergers in regressions’ #1 & #2 (the OLS & Random Effects estimations). While this result 
is not in line with the behavioral literature on merger waves (where a higher stock market 
should lead to more mergers -- see Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2004, for an overview), the 
negative effect is not statistically robust throughout the six regression specifications.  
 We can now look at the causal relations between the variables of primary interest: 
the relationship between antitrust actions and merger frequencies: Prohibitions has a 
statistically-significant negative impact on future merger behavior in five out of the six 
regression equations (excluding only the OLS estimation in regression #1). The consistent 
significance and strong impact of this variable suggests that spikes in the use of Prohibitions 
                                                 
26 It appears then that law changes by themselves do not significantly impact merger behavior; instead, antitrust 
actions (the implementation of laws which we later discuss) seem to be key. The finding that only the 
enforcement of laws – not existence on the books – yields actual policy effects conforms with the existing 
literature (Boner & Krueger, 1991). Furthermore, this might help explain why the literature on the impact of 
antitrust laws on price-cost margins finds inconclusive evidence. 
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 seem to send a very clear signal of toughness by antitrust authorities—a signal that 
significantly reduces future merger proclivities.  
 Remedies, on the other hand, seem to positively influence future Mergers; though, 
the coefficient estimate is only significant in three regression equations—regressions’ #1, #2, 
& #4. Accordingly, we can interpret these results as suggesting that the effect of remedies 
coming at the expense of prohibitions (a lowering of antitrust toughness) is stronger than the 
effect of remedies coming at the expense of clearances (an increase in antitrust toughness). In 
other words, we have some evidence that firms seem to interpret spikes in remedies as 
indicating softer behavior on the part of antitrust authorities. Such an interpretation should be 
cautioned by the fact that the remedies coefficient estimate is not significant in the fixed-
effects estimation (regression #3); thus, suggesting that the remedies effect may only be 
capturing cross-jurisdictional variation. Nevertheless, the important point here is that the 
application of Remedies does not seemingly involve a significant deterrence effect. 
 Permitting a merger with the promise to monitor closely the future behavior of 
merging parties appears to send no signal to firms – the coefficient estimate (while mostly 
negative) is highly insignificant throughout our estimations. Accordingly, firms seem to not 
give any importance to Monitorings as an indication of the future tendencies of authorities. 
In sum, the empirical results support the robustness of Prohibitions—but not 
Remedies and Monitorings—in terms of deterrence effects. However, it is warranted to move 
beyond statistical significance and consider the economic significance that prohibitions may 
have on deterring future merger behavior. First off, the coefficient estimates for Prohibitions 
in Table 2 suggest that a 10% spike in Prohibitions leads to a percentage drop in Mergers in 
the following year that ranges from 0.5% (Regressions’ #1 & #2) to almost 1.6% (Regression 
#4).27 Consider the comparison between the US and the EU for more illustrative purposes: 
where the US stepped up prohibitions in 2002 (14 as compared to 9 in 2001) and the EU 
                                                 
27 These results must be interpreted as an upper bound, however, since we transformed zeros to ones when going 
to the log specification. 
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 stopped prohibitions (0 as compared to 5 in 2001). Taking the conservative coefficient 
estimate from Regression #2 suggests that the US faced almost 3.1 percent fewer mergers in 
2003 due to the 2002 spike in Prohibitions, while the EU faced some 5.5 percent more 
mergers in 2003 due to the 2002 drop in Prohibitions.28 In short, the regression estimations 
generally support significant-and-robust deterrence effects for the application of Prohibitions.  
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The deterrence effects of merger policy are generally an under-researched topic. The 
few studies in this area tend to focus on deterrence effects as manifested by mergers being 
shaped differently (composition-based deterrence), or as manifested by future price-cost 
margins (where it is difficult to disentangle regulatory from deterrence effects). Furthermore, 
few studies consider whether all the tools available for merger policy involve adequate 
deterrence. Accordingly, we focus on the impact of different merger-policy tools on 
frequency-based deterrence effects; we consider how different antitrust actions – prohibitions, 
remedies, and monitorings – influence the future proclivity of firms to engage in mergers. We 
bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue by employing a cross-jurisdictional data set for 
merger policies over the 1992-2005 period. The broad scope of our data allows consideration 
of whether changes in merger policy enforcement impact firms’ merger behavior.  
 Our empirical results suggest that antitrust actions can impact future merger 
frequencies; however, not all merger policy tools are effective deterrents. Prohibitions involve 
deterrence implications with respect to future merger frequencies, but both remedies – the 
most popular merger policy tool – and monitorings seem to involve no deterrence 
implications. The insignificant finding for monitorings does not greatly surprise, as they have 
                                                 
28 Note that if we took the liberal coefficient estimate from Regression #4; then, the US would face 8.8 percent 
fewer mergers in 2003 due to the 2002 spike in Prohibitions, while the EU would face 15.8 percent more 
mergers in 2003 due to the 2002 drop in Prohibitions. However, the coefficient estimate (-0.065) in Regression 
#6 – where Prohibitions is also instrumented for – conforms more to the conservative coefficient estimates in 
Regressions’ #1, #2 & #3; hence, it appears most prudent to interpret the conservative results. 
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 generally been considered a weak merger policy tool in terms of regulatory effects; hence, 
few deem this tool able to involve serious deterrence effects. The findings for prohibitions and 
remedies, however, generate more serious implications. 
First, the positive findings for prohibitions (where merger prohibition spikes lead to 
firms forsaking future merger proposals) suggest that antitrust actions can involve deterrence 
implications. While a small literature supports the existence of composition-based deterrence 
effects for merger policy, antitrust scholars and practitioners have generally needed to assume 
the existence of deterrence effects for merger policy, as it has been difficult to validate and 
quantify merger policy deterrence effects. Our empirical results suggest that merger policy – 
at least in the form of prohibitions – not only involves composition-based deterrence but also 
frequency-based deterrence. Accordingly, antitrust authorities should appreciate that 
prohibitions carry an ability to deter the future proclivity of firms to seek mergers.  
Second, the empirical findings for remedies suggest that this particular merger policy 
tool may not involve adequate deterrence. One should temper the implications from this 
finding, as we only consider frequency-based deterrence: put differently, remedies may still 
involve composition-based deterrence via the altering of how firms shape future merger 
proposals. Nevertheless, frequency-based deterrence is important in a world where antitrust 
authorities face budgetary and resource constraints. Therefore, our results imply that antitrust 
authorities should be cautious with regard to over-using remedies: remedies may indeed 
ameliorate the anti-competitive effects of proposed mergers, but such actions – unlike 
prohibitions – carry no robust negative effect on the future proclivity to merge. 
 We are not the first to suggest that remedies represent a weak merger policy tool; 
though, we are unique in citing the deterrence implications as a particular concern. A number 
of authors from different standpoints have criticized the effectiveness of remedies. Joskow 
(2002) argues that structural remedies are neither easy for authorities to apply nor easy for 
firms to adopt in light of the transaction costs involved. Joskow points out that many of the 
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 difficulties identified by the FTC (1999) study on divestitures – size not mattering, strategic 
behavior of divesting firms, information deficiencies of buying firms, and advisability of 
divesting on-going businesses versus assets – conform to a transaction cost economics 
perspective. Cabral (2003) claims that the interaction of divestitures with entry conditions 
may lead to unexpected outcomes: in particular, divestitures may make further entry 
unprofitable, thus leading to welfare-inferior market equilibria. Motta, Polo and Vasconcelos 
(2006) review a number of drawbacks that suggest remedies in the European context have not 
been effective; in particular, they suggest that remedies may act to enhance collusion. 
Furthermore, some empirical work finds remedies to generally be ineffective: Crandall and 
Winston (2003) find US consent decrees (namely, remedies) in two-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries to increase – not decrease – future price-cost margins; Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2006, 2007) generally find second-phase European Commission remedies to not ameliorate 
anti-competitive effects. Hence, we proffer one additional criticism – weak deterrence – to the 
list of potential concerns regarding remedies. 
 In sum, we find prohibitions to be effective and remedies to be ineffective in the 
deterrence of future merger frequencies. The weak-deterrence implications of remedies may 
be a concern in light of the trend toward increased use of remedies as a merger policy tool. 
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. captured the underlining faith that has led to increased adoption 
of remedies when he states "Divestiture … the most important of antitrust remedies. It is 
simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure".29 To the degree that antitrust authorities are 
concerned about the deterrence effects of merger policy, our results suggest that they may 
want to re-evaluate their penchant to increasingly employ remedies – instead of prohibitions – 
to deal with anti-competitive merger proposals. 
                                                 
29 See Parker and Balto (2000: p.5) for this quote. 
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Figure 1: The Average Across All Antitrust Jurisdictions of the Ratio of ‘Remedies to 
Prohibitions’
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 Figure 2: The Average Across All Antitrust Jurisdictions for the Number of 'Antitrust 
actions' and 'Mergers'
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Figure 3: The Average Across All Antitrust Jurisdictions of the Percentage of ‘Notified 
Mergers Eliciting Antitrust Actions’
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
• Number of Observations and Variable Means by Antitrust Jurisdiction 
 
  Variable Means 
 
Antitrust 
Jurisdiction 
Observation 
Numbers 
Mergers Prohibitions Remedies Monitorings
Australia 
 
9 200.4 3.7 4.9 0.2 
Austria 
 
5 241.2 0 2.8 0 
Belgium 
 
6 48.3 1.1 0.2 0.2 
Brazil 
 
6 563.7 0.3 10.5 0 
Canada 
 
11 288.3 0.3 3.9 0.6 
Czech Republic 
 
9 113.9 1.4 4.2 0 
Denmark 
 
4 44.8 0 1 0 
European Union 
 
12 230.7 1.5 15.3 0 
Finland 
 
5 81.6 0.2 2.8 0 
France 
 
4 497.8 0 2.5 0 
Germany 
 
11 1415.8 3.6 5.9 0 
Greece 
 
2 83.5 1 0 0 
Hungary 
 
9 62.2 0.3 1.2 0 
Ireland 
 
7 229.3 0.3 0.1 0 
Italy 
 
10 499.3 0.6 2.4 0 
Mexico 
 
7 244.3 1.9 7 0 
Netherlands 
 
5 112.2 0.2 1.6 0 
New Zealand 
 
9 76.8 3.4 2 0 
Norway 
 
7 35.9 0.3 1.9 0.1 
Poland 
 
3 498.7 0.4 1 0 
Portugal 
 
6 42.5 0 0.2 0.3 
Slovenia 
 
12 60.2 0.4 0.8 0 
Spain 
 
8 67.9 0.4 3.4 0 
Sweden 
 
10 135.6 0.6 1.6 0 
Switzerland 
 
6 37.8 0 1 0 
Turkey 
 
5 117.4 0.4 1.8 0 
United Kingdom 
 
10 379.5 2.3 5.7 0.2 
United States 
 
11 2766.4 15.2 43 0 
 
All Jurisdictions 
 
 
209 
 
390.5 
 
1.8 
 
5.8 
 
0.1 
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Table #2 Regression Results for Merger Conduct in Response to Antitrust Actions 
• All Estimations involve Robust Standard Errors; fixed period-specific effects; and 209 observations 
• Dependent Variable: Number of Notified Mergers 
 
 Estimations Without Instrumenting  GMM Instrumenting Estimations 
 
OLS 
 
 
Random 
Effects 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
  
Instrument 
for Mergers 
 
Instrument 
for Mergers 
& Stock-
Market 
Instrument 
for Full set 
 
Regression # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Mergers t-1 
 
 
1.036*** 
(0.080) 
1.076*** 
(0.077) 
0.793*** 
(0.090)  
1.019*** 
(0.104) 
1.051*** 
(0.083) 
1.060*** 
(0.082) 
Mergers t-2 
 
 
-0.078 
(0.079) 
-0.108 
(0.080) 
-0.081 
(0.085)  
-0.127 
(0.081) 
-0.111 
(0.082) 
-0.097 
(0.084) 
Prohibitions t-1 
 
 
-0.047 
(0.034) 
-0.055** 
(0.026) 
-0.079* 
(0.046)  
-0.158* 
(0.090) 
-0.095** 
(0.050) 
-0.065* 
(0.037) 
Remedies t-1 
 
 
0.048** 
(0.025) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.037)  
0.075* 
(0.045) 
0.053 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
Monitorings t-1 
 
 
Threshold1 
-0.071 
(0.087) 
-0.072 
(0.056) 
-0.030 
(0.087)  
0.086 
(0.248) 
-0.171 
(0.211) 
-0.024 
(0.138) 
t 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.057) 
0.003 
(0.052) 
-0.235*** 
(0.089)  
0.097 
(0.130) 
-0.034 
(0.118) 
-0.018 
(0.087) 
Threshold2 t 
 
 
 
-0.045 
(0.068) 
-0.030 
(0.064) 
-0.067 
(0.090)  
0.165 
(0.278) 
0.089 
(0.193) 
-0.079 
(0.106) 
Threshold3 t  
 
 
-0.044 
(0.150) 
-0.093 
(0.150) 
0.089 
(0.156)  
-0.684 
(0.617) 
-0.301 
(0.422) 
-0.057 
(0.156) 
Law1 t 
 
 
0.032 
(0.061) 
0.020 
(0.054) 
0.285*** 
(0.112)  
-0.306 
(0.147) 
-0.127 
(0.111) 
-0.022 
(0.100) 
Law2 t 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.080) 
-0.002 
(0.062) 
0.050 
(0.099)  
0.109 
(0.201) 
-0.125 
(0.147) 
-0.013 
(0.106) 
EU 2004 Reform 
 
 
-0.164* 
(0.101) 
-0.138 
(0.107) 
-0.161* 
(0.098)  
-0.613* 
(0.357) 
-0.343* 
(0.206) 
-0.188 
(0.131) 
Growth t 
 
 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.014)  
-0.003 
(0.021) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
Stock-Market t 
 
-0.0007** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0020 
(0.0016)  
-0.0013 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0007 
(0.0008) 
Constant 
 
 
0.219 
(0.235) 
0.190 
(0.167) 
1.19*** 
(0.354)  
0.710*** 
(0.269) 
0.374** 
(0.180) 
0.270 
(0.187) 
 
Arellano-Bond test that 
aver. auto covariance in 
residuals of order 2 is 0      
 
z = 0.53   
Pr > z = 0.599 
 
z = 0.57   
Pr > z = 0.567 
 
z = 0.59  
Pr > z = 0.555
 
Hansen Test of over-
identifying restrictions 
     
 
chi2(53)=3.95  
Pr > chi2=1.0 
 
chi2(60)=2.44  
Pr > chi2=1.0 
 
chi2(96)=2.43  
Pr > chi2=1.0 
R2 0.96  0.92        
 
(  ) = standard error;  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% Significance. 
 
 
 41
Bücher des Schwerpunkts Märkte und Politik  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Politics 
  
 
Kai A. Konrad, Beate Jochimsen (Eds.) 
Finanzkrise im Bundesstaat 
2006, Peter Lang Verlag 
Robert Nuscheler 
On Competition and Regulation in Health Care 
Systems 
2005, Peter Lang Verlag 
Pablo Beramendi 
Decentralization and Income Inequality 
2003, Madrid: Juan March Institute 
Thomas Cusack 
A National Challenge at the Local Level: Citizens, 
Elites and Institutions in Reunified Germany 
2003, Ashgate 
Sebastian Kessing 
Essays on Employment Protection 
2003, Freie Universität Berlin  
http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2003/202 
Daniel Krähmer 
On Learning and Information in Markets and 
Organizations 
2003, Shaker Verlag 
Tomaso Duso 
The Political Economy of the Regulatory Process: 
An Empirical Approach 
Humboldt-University Dissertation, 2002, Berlin, 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/duso-tomaso-
2002-07-17/PDF/Duso.pdf 
Bob Hancké 
Large Firms and Institutional Change. Industrial 
Renewal and Economic Restructuring in France 
2002, Oxford University Press 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Peter A. Hall, David Soskice (Eds.) 
Varieties of Capitalism 
2001, Oxford University Press 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von Führungsgremien 
japanischer Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, David Soskice 
(Eds.) 
Unions, Employers, and Central Banks 
2000, Cambridge University Press 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-rita-
2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
Ralph Siebert 
Innovation, Research Joint Ventures, and 
Multiproduct Competition 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/siebert-
ralph-2000-03-23/  
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Europe and the Member States 
2000, edition sigma 
Jianping Yang 
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen: 
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christoph Schenk 
Cooperation between Competitors – 
Subcontracting and the Influence of Information, 
Production and Capacity on Market Structure and 
Competition 
1999, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/schenk-
christoph-1999-11-16  
  
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2006 
 
Klaus Gugler 
Dennis C. Müller 
B. Burçin Yurtoglu 
The Determinants of Merger Waves SP II 2006 – 01 
Augusto R. Micola 
Albert Banal Estañol 
Derek W. Bunn 
Incentives and Cooperation in Vertically Related 
Energy Markets 
SP II 2006 – 02  
Benny Geys Looking across Borders: A Test of Spatial Policy 
Interdependence using Local Government 
Efficiency Ratings 
SP II 2006 – 03 
Thomas R. Cusack Sinking Budgets and Ballooning Prices: Recent 
Developments Connected to Military Spending 
SP II 2006 – 04 
Ela Glowicka Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU SP II 2006 – 05 
Benny Geys Government Weakness and Electoral Cycles in 
Local Public Debt:  
Evidence from Flemish Municipalities 
SP II 2006 – 06 
Benny Geys 
Bruno Heyndels 
Disentangling the Effects of Political 
Fragmentation on Voter Turnout: The Flemish 
Municipal Elections 
SP II 2006 – 07 
Johannes Münster Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and 
Participation 
SP II 2006 – 08 
Johannes Münster Contests with Investment SP II 2006 – 09 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Steinar Vagstad 
Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion 
SP II 2006 – 10 
Hilde Coffé  
Benny Geys 
Towards an Empirical Characterization of Bridging 
and Bonding Social Capital 
SP II 2006 – 11 
Tomaso Duso 
Klaus Gugler 
Burçin Yurtoglu 
How Effective is European Merger Control? SP II 2006 – 12 
Erkki Koskela 
Ronnie Schöb 
Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining 
and Individual Effort Determination 
SP II 2006 – 13 
Derek Clark 
Kai A. Konrad 
Contests with Multi-Tasking SP II 2006 – 14 
 
Brian Roberson Pork-Barrel Politics, Discriminatory Policies, and 
Fiscal Federalism 
SP II 2006 – 15 
Jonathan Beck The Sales Effect of Word of Mouth:  A Model for 
Creative Goods and Estimates for Novels 
SP II 2006 – 16 
Albert Banal-Estañol  
Paul Heidhues 
Rainer Nitsche 
Jo Seldeslachts 
Merger Clusters during Economic Booms SP II 2006 – 17 
Susanne Prantl The Role of Policies Supporting New Firms:  An 
Evaluation for Germany after Reunification 
SP II 2006 – 18  
Tomaso Duso 
Klaus Gugler 
Burçin Yurtoglu 
Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger 
Analysis? A Comparison of Stock Market and 
Accounting Data 
SP II 2006 – 19 
Michał Grajek 
Tobias Kretschmer 
Usage and Diffusion of Cellular Telephony, 1998-
2004 
SP II 2006 – 20 
Susanne Prantl 
Matthias Almus 
Jürgen Egeln 
Dirk Engel 
Bankintermediation bei der Kreditvergabe an junge 
oder kleine Unternehmen 
SP II 2006 – 21 
Joseph A. Clougherty 
Michał Grajek 
The Impact of ISO 9000 Diffusion on Trade and FDI: 
A New Institutional Analysis 
SP II 2006 – 22 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Frode Meland 
Odd Rune Straume 
Can Deunionization Lead to International 
Outsourcing? 
SP II 2006 – 23 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Trond E.Olsen 
Odd Rune Straume 
Cross-Border Mergers and Strategic Trade Policy 
with Two-Part Taxation: Is International Policy 
Coordination Beneficial? 
SP II 2006 – 24 
Paul Heidhues 
Botond Kőszegi 
Competition and Price Variation when Consumers 
are Loss Averse 
SP II 2006 – 25 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2007 
 
Kai A. Konrad Strategy in Contests – an Introduction SP II 2007 – 01 
Jo Seldeslachts 
Joseph A. Clougherty 
Pedro Pita Barros 
Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow:  The 
Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools 
SP II 2007 – 02 
   
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und Informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
